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I. Introduction 
What recourse is there for a farmer who owns a 
farm , and finds that farm threatened by increased 
residential and commercial developments? Such a 
farmer, while receiving more and more complaints 
about normal and necessary farm operations, may 
also be tempted to sell the land by offers to purchase 
pieces of the farm here and there. These problems 
are the focus of farmland preservation measures-
measures designed to preserve farmland in use as 
farmland . 
The primary purpose of farmland preservation 
techniques is maintenance of agricultural land as 
a food source.l The question necessarily arises 
whether there is even a need for as much farmland 
as presently exists. There are surpluses of most 
crops and the government is still paying farmers 
not to plant their land. Although there may be no 
immediate crisis of reduced acreage, agriculture 
has pushed farmland to its limits. Technology has 
been pushed to its limit in terms of yields per acre. 
The soil has been pushed to its limit in terms of 
what it can sustain. Although we may not have 
experienced yet any repercussions from the declin-
ing number of acres in use as farmland, in the near 
future we may experience such repercussions as 
demand for agricultural products begins to exceed 
supply. 
The primary threat to farmland is development. 2 
Although the metropolitan areas in this country 
encompass only 17% of our total land mass, they 
encompass 20% of our prime farmland. 3 As a result, 
there is an additional reason for farmland preser-
vation in rapidly developing areas: preservation of 
open space and scenic beauty.4 In highly developed 
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areas farmland is now a natural resource and a 
rare commodity. In these areas, such as Suffolk 
County, New York, and Montgomery County, Mary-
land, the most direct, effective and stringent farm-
land preservation measures in use are being im-
posed. 
II. Farmland Preservation Techniques 
Farmland preservation techniques are either di-
rect or indirect. The most commonly utilized, the 
most widely accepted, and the least effective are 
indirect measures, which are primarily tax reforms. 
Such measures simply attempt to put cash back 
into the pockets of the farmer in order to encourage 
the farmer to continue farming. One such tax meas-
ure is differential assessment of agricultural land 
for property taxes, by which agricultural land is 
assessed at its agricultural use value rather than 
at its usually higher current market value.1i A sim-
ilar tax reform is farm use valuation for inheritance 
taxes. The idea behind farm use valuation for in-
heritance taxes is keeping the farm in the family 
upon a death in the family, that is, not to have the 
family lose the farm as a result of high inheritance 
taxes. Again, the farm is valued at its farm use 
value rather than at its higher current market 
value.6 A somewhat more effective indirect method 
is the utilization of income tax credits, as in Mich-
igan and Wisconsin. In these states the farmer may 
use some or all of his or her local property taxes as 
dollar for dollar credits against state income taxes.7 
The more direct measures for farmland preser-
vation vary widely in their effectiveness and in 
their implementation. The most widespread is ag-
ricultural zoning, that is, zoning that restricts uses 
in the zone to agriculture and related uses, either 
exclusively or nonexclusively.8 A second method is 
agricultural districting: the non-binding designa-
tion for long term agricultural use of an area within 
the state on a voluntary basis. Farms that partic-
ipate on a voluntary basis within the district be-
come eligible for certain designated governmental 
benefits and programs.9 Somewhat similar is com- . 
prehensive planning, which is usually statewide 
planning combining land use and other programs 
designed to encourage an area to remain in long 
term agricultural uses. 10 Development pennit sys-
tems require a special permit over and beyond the 
usual building and zoning permits for construction 
on agricultural land, so that more serious consid-
eration will be given to an increase in development 
in an agricultural area. 11 
The fmal three direct methods are the most com-
plex, the most interesting, and possibly the most 
effective. The first is right-to-farm legislation, or 
the so-called right-to-farm acts. These acts insulate 
farmers from nuisance suits under circumstances 
that vary from statute to statute. 12 The other two 
programs are purchase of development rights and 
transfer of development rights. 13 These last two 
programs are best explained by way of an illustra-
tion. 
Assume that an area is zoned so that ten housing 
units can be built per acre. Within this zone is a 
fann which has only one house built on it, and the 
zoning board decides that it would like to maintain 
the entire area at that level of development. The 
zoning board then zones the area so that it can have 
only one housing unit per acre. It may be that an 
area landowner would bring a taking challenge to 
the zoning restriction. To forestall that possibility, 
the zoning board could sever the development 
rights from the property and make them available 
either for immediate sale to the local planning 
agency or a "land bank," in which case it is a pur-
chase of development rights program, or to other 
landowners in a designated receiving area, in which 
case it is a transfer of development rights program. 
In essence, then, the right to develop the property 
is severed from the property so that it cannot be 
used on that property, but it is severed so that it 
can be sold either to a local planning agency or land 
bank, or to other landowners in a designated re-
ceiving parcel. 14 
III. Farmland Preservation in Arkansas 
A. Tax Measures 
The Arkansas statutes provide for both an indi-
rect method and a direct method of farmland pres-
ervation. The indirect method is, as might be ex-
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pected, a tax measure: differential assessment 01 
agricultural land for property taxes. Section 84-483 
of the Arkansas Statutes provided for differential 
assessment of agricultural land for state property 
taxes. 15 For a brief period this provision was 
deemed unconstitutional; in Arkansas Public Serv-
ice Commission v. Pulaski County Board of Equal-
ization,I6 the Arkansas Supreme Court struck 
down differential assessment for agricultural land 
as being in violation of the state constitution's uni-
formity clause. The uniformity clause provides that 
all land within the state has to be assessed at the 
same valueP In November of 1980, however, 
through Amendment No. 59 to the Arkansas Con-
stitution, the old section 5 of Article 16 was re-
pealed and new sections 5 and 15(b) were added to 
Article 16. These now provide that agricultural 
land can be valued for taxation purposes upon the 
basis of its agricultural productivity or use.18 
B. The Right-to.Farm Act 
The one direct method of farmland preservation 
in Arkansas is the Right-to-Farrn Act. In 1981, the 
Arkansas legislature passed right-to-farrn legisla-
tion to protect Arkansas farms from nuisance suits 
often brought by owners of nearby residences or 
other private development. Section 34-122 pro-
vides: 
An agricultural facility or its appurtenances or 
the operation thereof shall not be or become a 
nuisance, private or public, as a result of any 
changed conditions in and about the locality 
thereof after the same has been in operation for 
a period of one (1] year or more, when such fa-
cility, its appurtenances or the operation thereof 
was not a nuisance at the time the operation 
thereof began. 19 
Therefore, an agricultural facility cannot be a nuis-
ance as a result of changed conditions in its locality 
after it has been in operation for one year. The 
principle is to strengthen the familiar "coming to 
the nuisance" defense that the common law ofnuis-
ance has always treated somewhat diffidently. 
Courts applying the common law treat "coming to 
the nuisance" as a factor to be resisted, but not as 
an absolute defense. 2o If a person moves next door 
to a poultry operation, at common law that person 
may still complain about the normal operations of 
the poultry operation after having moved into that 
area. The act changes this, by making "coming to 
the nuisance" a defense with real teeth. 
"Agricultural facility" is defined under § 34-121 
to include, but not be limited to, "any plant, facility, 
structure or establishment used for the feeding, 
growing, production, holding, processing, storage or 
distribution, for commercial purposes, of crops, live-
stock, poultry, swine or fish or products derived 
from any of them. "21 The act also provides under 
§ 34-123 that the provisions of the act do not have 
any effect on legal actions to reoover damages from 
injuries sustained from "any pollution of, or change 
in the condition of, the waters of any stream or on 
account of any overflow of the lands of any person, 
firm or corporation."22 Not only does the act protect 
the farmer from nuisance suits, but under § 34-124 
it also renders void any municipal or county ordi-
nance making the operation of an agricultural fa- . 
cility a nuisance under the circumstances prohib~ 
ited in the act.2S Finally, under § 34-126, an 
agricultural facility will lose the protection of the 
act if the facility "materially changes its character 
of operation or materially increases the size of its 
physical plant. "24 For example, if an individual 
moves next door to a vegetable farm, and it sub-
sequently becomes a feedlot, the operation would 
not be protected under the act from the neighbor's 
nuisance suit. 
There are no reported cases in Arkansas under 
the Right-to-Farm Act. There are two possible ex-
planations. First, it may be that the lack of case 
law is attributable to the conflict between farmland 
and development not having reached a point at 
which there is a need for the act. The alternative 
explanation is that there is a lack of awareness of 
the protections ofthe act both on the part offarmers 
and their lawyers. 
There are many unanswered questions under the · 
Arkansas Right-to-Farm Act due to the lack of ju-
dicial interpretation and the very broad statutory 
language. For example, is the definition of an "ag-
ricultural facility" as broad as it seems? It includes 
a facility processing products "derived from" crops, 
livestock, poultry, swine or fish. Would a fertilizer 
processing plant be included? It is difficult to imag-
ine any facility that has any connection. with ag-
ricultural products that would not be\ included 
within the definition. 
A facility is protected from nuisance suits as a 
result of "changed conditions" in the locality. What 
constitutes "changed conditions"? How extensive 
must the encroaching development be? If an area 
that was used only for farming is still primarily a 
farming area but is experiencing increased resi-
dential development, and complaints are being 
brought against a farm in that area, can the farmer 
defend on the ground that there are changed con-
ditions in the locality? 
If the facility has to be in operation for more than 
one year before any "changed conditions," what is 
necessary for it to be "in operation?" How consistent 
must the operation be during that period of time? 
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Is a barn on a lot sufficient to have the facility 
qualify as being "in operation?" 
A facility will not be protected under the act if it 
was a nuisance at the time it began. Who proves 
that the facility was or was not a nuisance at the 
time it began? What kind of evidence is necessary? 
Would evidence of complaints by landowners be suf-
ficient, or would the evidence have to be more for-
mal-for example, complaints flIed with local agen-
cies or lawsuits flIed? 
A facility loses its protection under the act if there 
is a "material change" in the character or size of 
the operation. What is such a "material change''? 
Is a material change for the better from a nuisance 
law perspective nevertheless enough to make the 
facility lose its protection under the act? rnti-
mately, will this provision discourage innovative 
farming techniques or improvements in farming 
techniques by farmers? 
As mentioned earlier, the act does not prohibit 
suits based on water (not air) pollution, changes in 
the condition of water, or any overflow of the land. 
How would these provisions interrelate with any 
applicable state permits or federal permits for dis-
charges into streams and the farmer's compliance 
with those permits? If a farmer is complying with 
all state and federal permits, and a nuisance law-
suit is brought, is the nuisance lawsuit then not 
based on water pollution? 
How may the farmer utilize the provision making 
local ordinances void under the circumstances pro-
hibited in the act? Can this provision only be used 
as an affIrmative defense to a prosecution under 
the ordinances? Or can the farmer somehow utilize 
the provision to prevent passage of such ordinances 
in the fIrst place? 
The biggest potential "loophole" in the act should 
also be noted. Although the act restricts actions 
based on nuisance, it may not restrict suits predi-
cated on negligence or trespass, which can some-
times bring esentially the same type of complaint 
before a court. The extent to which this potential 
loophole exists for causes of action predicated on 
negligence is problematic, however, due to disa-
greement over what types of conducf are encom-
passed in the term "nuisance." According to the 
Second Restatement of Torts and the fourth edition 
of PROSSER ON TORTS, nuisance is a field of tort 
liability with reference to interference with land 
uses, rather than a separate and distinct type of 
tortious conduct. According to this approach, lia-
bility for "nuisance" may rest upon an intentional 
invasion of the plaintiffs interests, negligence, or 
strict liability.25 In contrast the most recent edition 
of PROSSER rejects the approach of the Second Res-
tatement and the late William Prosser and char-
acterizes nuisance as encompassing only inten-
tional interference of a substantial and unreason-
able nature in another's use and enjoyment of 
land.26 
This scholarly disagreement is of significant 
practical importance to what causes of action are 
precluded under the Arkansas Right-to-Farm Act. 
Under the act, a qualifying agricultural facility may 
not be held liable on a "nuisance" theory. By using 
the term "nuisance," did the legislature intend to 
insulate agricultural facilities from tort liability 
predicated on intentional interference, strict lia-
bility and negligence, or simply from liability for 
intentional interference constituting an unreason-
able interference with the plaintiffs land? This de-
termination is complicated by the fact that the Ar-
kansas statute did not retain the provision in the 
North Carolina statute on which it is modeled 
which expressly retains an agricultural facility's 
liability for negligence. Did the Arkansas legisla-
ture omit that provision because it intended to in-
sulate agricultural facilities from negligence lia-
bility, or did it omit the provision on the assumption 
that insulation from "nuisance" liability did not en-
compass liability for negligence, thus obviating the 
need for an express provision so providing? 
IV. An Innovative Technique for Farmland 
Pre8ervation-Transferable Development 
Right8 
One of the more innovative techniques for farm-
land preservation is the transfer of development 
rights (''TOR's''). As discussed earlier, TOR's sever 
the development rights from a piece of property so 
that they can be sold to developers or landowners 
in a designated receiving parcel with a higher den-
sity of zoning. 
There are many practical problems with TOR 
programs. From the perspective of the farmer, the 
farmer may wish to develop his farmland due to 
approaching retirement, desire for profit, or any 
number of reasons. Because the development rights 
have been severed from his property, he may sell 
those development rights but he may not utilize 
those development rights on his own property. The 
primary practical problem with TDR's is creation 
of a market for sale of the TDR's. It is very difficult 
to assess what the market value of TOR's should 
be so that the landowner receives sufficient eco-
nomic return on those development rights. Added 
to this difficulty is the difficulty in selecting a re-
ceiving parcel with a high enough potential for den-
sity to create a demand for sale of TOR's that will 
reflect that market value in the purchase and sale 
between the farmer and the landowner.28 The pur-
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pose of the TDR's is defeated if the farmer is stuck 
with TDR's that he cannot sell. The farmer will 
have no economic return for the restrictions based 
on his property, he may bring a taking challenge, 
and the local planning agency will be threatened 
with a lawsuit. 
An alternative to TDR's is to have the local plan-
ning agency or a "land bank" agree to purchase the 
development rights from the landowner to hold in 
abeyance or to sell to individual landowners or de-
velopers in a designated receiving parcel. In this 
situation the program is a purchase of development 
rights ("POR") program rather than a true TOR 
program. A PDR program would shift the economic 
risk from the farmer to the local planning agency 
or land bank, but in that case the local planning 
agency or land bank must have sufficient money to 
engage in widespread purchase of the development 
rights.29 
The primary legal issue that arises in connection 
with zoning schemes utilizing TDR's is the question 
of whether there is a taking without just compen-
sation. Overly restrictive government regulation 
may constitute deprivation of private property 
without just compensation under the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Con-
stitution.so TOR's are essentially designed to fore-
stall such a taking challenge by providing the land-
owner with sufficient economic return on the 
development rights to undermine the constitu-
tional claim. Under the traditional taking test a 
taking occurs when the landowner is deprived of 
all or almost all of the economic value of his prop-
erty as a whole.S! 
The principal Supreme Court opinion in this area 
is Penn Central Transportation Company v. City of 
New York. 32 In Penn Central, there was a taking 
challenge to New York City's landmarks preser-
vation law designating Grand Central Station as a 
landmark and granting TOR's in return for restric-
tions on the right to develop. The Supreme Court 
in an opinion by Justice Brennan upheld New York 
City's landmarks preservation law, concluding that 
there was no taking because there were sufficient 
economic uses remaining in the property as a whole 
so that a taking had not been established. In de-
termining whether there had been a taking, the 
court suggested that the value of TOR's granted to 
the landmark owner was a factor to be considered 
in whether there was a taking. 33 
Justice Rehnquist in his dissent took a very dif-
ferent approach. He focused only on the particular 
property right that had been taken, the right to 
develop the air space above Grand Central Station, 
and concluded that there was indeed a taking of 
the property right and, therefore, a taking in the 
constitutional sense. He also concluded that TDR's 
were relevant only to the issue of whether "just 
compensation" had been given once a taking had 
been found. 34 
These are two very different approaches, with 
significant repercussions for the future of taking 
law. On the taking issue generally, since Penn Cen-
tral there has been a series of Supreme Court cases 
suggesting that the members of the court are mov-
ing away from Justice Brennan's traditional ap-
proach on the taking issue and toward Justice 
Rehnquist's approach, which focuses on the extent 
of governmental interference with a particular 
property right (e.g., the right to develop) rather 
than on the economic effects on the property as a 
whole. In these later cases, Kaiser Aetna v. United 
States ,56 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV 
Corporation,sa and Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Com-
pany,S7 there is a strong suggestion that the court 
is beginning to focus more on the particular prop-
erty right that is taken rather than on the economic 
effects of the property as a whole. As a result, re-
maining economic uses of the property after inter-
ference with a particular property right have be-
come less significant than they were under the 
traditional taking test. The end result is that there 
is a greater likelihood of successful taking chal-
lenges. If a particular property right is taken in its 
entirety, and that economic right is determined to 
be economically significant, there may be a taking 
although there may still remain economically via-
ble uses of the property. 
The Supreme Court has recently avoided several 
cases in which restrictive zoning coupled with a 
grant of TDR's have been challenged as a taking. 8S 
Such scenarios appear likely to recur until the court 
is squarely confronted with the issue. The ramifi-
cations for taking law upon adoption of Rehnquist's 
approach would be that it would be easier to bring 
a taking challenge and concomittantly more diffi-
cult for planning agencies to engage in innovative 
land use techniques. 
There are several criticisms to which Justice 
Rehnquist's approach may be subjected. From an 
economic perspective, it makes little sense to eval-
uate a purported taking from the perspective of its 
economic effect on a single property right rather 
than from the perspective of the economic effects 
of the regulation on the property as a whole. As 
Justice Rehnquist points out, however, the tradi-
tional taking approach raises the dilemma of de-
fining the unit of property upon which the economic 
effects are to be evaluated. However, this problem 
can be adequately dealt with by the Court by simply 
deferring to the factual fmdings and economic de-
terminations of the local planning agency. There is 
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authority for such an approach under the present 
formulation of the so-called Ben Avon doctrine of 
judicial review. 59 Also, from a legal perspective, rel-
egating the value ofTDR's to the issue of just com-
pensation would render TDR's irrelevant to a tak-
ing challenge under the takings clause although 
ostensibly they would still be a relevant to a related 
due process challenge. For these reasons and from 
a public policy perspective of preserving our natural 
resources, Justice Brennan's approach in Penn Cen-
tral should prevail over that of Justice Rebnquist. 
Land use innovation has made many traditional 
legal concepts of takings obsolete. What is needed 
in taking law is more flexibility, not less flexibility, 
and Justice Rehnquist's approach promises a more 
formalistic, rigid approach. 
TDR's, whatever their future might be, are only 
one of several recent innovative techniques in farm-
land preservation. Greater awareness of all avail-
able preservation techniques, both in Arkansas and 
in other jurisdictions, should be encouraged from 
the threat of expanding residential development if 
agriculture is to be protected as an industry within 
Arkansas. 
FOOTNOTES 
1. R. COUOHLIN & J. KEENE, NATIONAL AORICULTURAL LANDs 
STUDY (NALS) 16 (1981) {hereinafter cited as NALS STUDY]. 
2.Id. 
3. M . ScHNEPf, FARMLAND, FOOD AND THE FuTuRE 29 (1979). 
4. See Duncan, Toward a Theory of Broad-based Planning for 
the Preservation of Agricultural Land, 24 NAT. REs. J. 61 , 119 
(1984). 
5. NALS STUDY, supra note 1, at 17. 
6. Id. at 19. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. at 21-24. 
9. Id. at 20-21. 
10. Id. at 17. 
11. [d. 
12. Id. at 2l. 
13. [d. at 24-25. 
14. For further explanation of each ofthese preservation tech-
niques, see NALS STUDY, supra note 1. 
15. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 84-483 (Cum. Supp 1979). 
16. 266 Ark. 64, 582 S.W.2d 942 (1979). 
17. ARK. CONST. art. 16. 
18. ARK. CONST. art. 16, §§ 5 and 15(b) (Cum. Supp. 1983). 
In addition, Arkansas uses the federal estate tax law to define 
the taxable estate for state estate tax purposes, and imposes a 
state estate tax in the amount of the permissible state death 
tax credit under federal law. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 63-103 (Cum. 
Supp. 1983). This incorporation of the federal definition of tax-
able estate means that farms qualifying for section 2032A val-
uation of agricultural land under federal law will have the ben-
efit of 2032A valuation for their state estate taxes as well. 
19. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-122 (Cum. Supp. 1983). 
20. DOBBS, KEEToN & OWEN, PRoSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAw 
OF TORTS, 634-36 (5th ed. 1984). 
21. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-121 (Cum. Supp. I9Ba). 
22. [d. § 34-123. 
23. [d. § 34-124. 
24. 1d. § 34-126. 
25. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS 573 (4th ed. 
1971). 
26. DoBBS, KEETON & OWEN, PROSSER AND KEEToN ON THE LAw 
OF TORTS 622-23 (5th ed. 1984). 
27. N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 106-701 (Cum. Supp. 1981). 
28. See generally, Merriam, Making TDR Work, 56 N.C.L. 
REv. 77 (1978). 
29. See generally, Peterson & McCarthy, Farmland Preser-
vation by Purchau of Devewpment Right8, 26 DEPAUL L. REv. 
447 (1978). 
30. See text accompanying notes 32-37 infra. 
31. [d. 
32. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
33. [d. at 137. 
34. 1d. at 151-52 (dissenting opinion). 
35. 444 U.S. 164 (1979). 
36. 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
37. 52 U.S.L.W. 4886 (June 26, 1984). 
38. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); San Diego 
Gas & Electric v. City of San Diego, 456 U.S. 621 (1981); Aptos 
Seascape Corp. v. County of Santa Cruz, 138 Cal. App. 3d 484, 
188 Cal. Rptr. 193 (1982), appeal. dismissed, 104 S.Ct. 53, 78 
L.Ed.2d 73 (1983). . 
39. See Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 
287 (1920). 
78 
